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Abstract. We call our innate ability for computation the ‘mathematica
utens’. This paper is an attempt to introduce a cognitively based semi-
otic model for the concepts of such ‘naive’ mathematics. We argue that
(naive) mathematics is a level of knowledge representation mediating
between (naive) logic and natural language.
1 Introduction
In recent years we developed a theory of knowledge representation [2] which by
virtue of its cognitive basis may bridge the gap between the ‘naive’ and formal
concepts of knowledge. Why is such a link important? One of the reasons is
the inherent potential of the cognitively based approach for efficiently modeling
knowledge in domains that are closely related to perception. An example is
natural language, and its model introduced in [8] which has been shown to be
linearly complex [9]. But there is also another reason that could be equally
important. If, indeed, knowledge arises via cognition from the observation of
‘real’ world phenomena, then this feature must hold for knowledge generated
formally, via computation, as well. We argue that such formal ‘knowledge’ may
become ‘real’ knowledge, if it is interpreted as such, that is, as a sign of some
(potentially) observable phenomenon.
This paper is an attempt to prove that our framework can be successfully ap-
plied to the mathematical domain, in particular, to the concepts of ‘naive’ math-
ematics. Additionally we argue that (naive) mathematics is a level of knowledge
representation mediating between (naive) logic and natural language. Finally we
show that the mathematical notion of ‘infinite’ and the prototypical concepts of
human knowledge may share a common representation.
In the definition and classification of signs we follow Peirce’s semiotics [4];
with respect to a theory of cognition we refer to categorical perception [5].
1.1 Cognition and signs
Historically, Peirce’s semiotic theory initially has been centered around his three
types of signs: the icon, index and symbol. Later he completed his list to include
nine types, and defined a hierarchy of signs. Our research has revealed that
those additional types of signs play an important role in sign recognition, which
is a cognitively based process of re-presentations. The essence of this process is
summarized in the next section.
Sign recognition Signs arise from the observation of events, which in turn
are due to a change in the ‘real’ world. The occurrence of a change triggers the
brain which samples the physical stimuli in a percept. The comparison of the
current percept with the previous one enables the brain to distinguish between
two sorts of qualities: one, which was there and remained there, which we call a
state; and another, which, though it was not there, is there now, which we call an
effect. State and effect qualities and, ambiguously so, their sets are respectively
denoted by a and b. From the logical point of view, the comparison of percepts
involves the application of the dual operations: ‘and’, and ‘inhibition’ (or ‘relative
difference’). From the semiotic point of view, such a comparison is an interaction
between qualities which are signs: a sign interaction.
The input qualities trigger the memory, which in turn generates a response,
representing memorized state and effect qualities. Such qualities, as well as their
sets, will be ambiguously denoted by a’ and b’ . Because the memory response
can signify the input either in the sense of agreement(‘∗’), or possibility(‘+’),
an observation is finally represented, respectively, by the observed and comple-
mentary state (A=a∗a’ , ¬A=a+a’ ), and effect (B=b∗b’ , ¬B=b+b’ ), collectively
called the input signs. By interpreting ‘∗’ and ‘+’ as the logical operations ‘and’
and ‘or’, respectively, we get the logical meaning of these signs.
We argue that the ground for any re-presentation is our ability for recog-
nizing similarity via comparison. An example for such an interaction is the one
between previous and current percept, or between input and memory. By apply-
ing comparisons recursively, the brain brings forth a process of sign interactions
generating increasingly better approximations of the final proposition of an ob-
servation. We maintain that such approximations have the aspects of Peirce’s
types of signs and can be interpreted, from the logical point of view, as Boolean
logical functions. We will capitalize on this relation, and refer to a (type of) sign
by means of its Boolean logical denotation.
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Fig. 1. Peirce’s classification of signs and aspects
The process of sign recognition proceeds as follows. First, the observed input
signs are represented via sorting, from the point of view of similarity and simul-
taneity (A+B, A∗B). Next, the relative difference of these signs is signified by
the abstract denotations of the observation (A∗¬B, ¬A∗B, and A∗¬B+¬A∗B).
Also the complementary input signs (context) are represented in the sense of
sorting (¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B). Subsequently, those abstract denotations are com-
plemented by the meaning of the context (A+¬B, ¬A+B, and A∗B+¬A∗¬B),
and a final proposition sign is generated via predication (A is B). In [8], we
pointed out that each of these re-presentations amounts to a type of comparison
sign interaction.
Peirce’s signs and their aspects are depicted in fig. 1. The Boolean interpre-
tation of the types of signs and the process of sign recognition, that we call the
innate or ‘naive’ logic of the brain, is displayed in fig. 2 (a horizontal line de-
notes a sign interaction). Complex phenomena can be recognized recursively, via
nested observations [2]. The proposition sign, A is B, of a nested phenomenon
is represented degenerately in the nesting phenomenon as a (complementary)
qualisign, which is a subset of A, or B.
Characteristic to our model of the process of sign recognition is that the
interpreter is the brain as a biological system. The signs recognized are beneath
the limen of intellect, and are only preliminary with respect to the signs that
appear in our consciousness. We hold that the types of such signs could be
identical to those defined by Peirce in his decadic classification [11]. But further
research is needed to reveal if this conjecture1 might be true.
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Fig. 2. The classification of Boolean signs and sign interactions
Domains and interpretations In past years we introduced various applica-
tions of our theory of knowledge representation, amongst others, a model for the
semiosis of (naive) propositional logical, syllogistic and reasoning signs. Such
signs, which comprise our logical faculty that we call the ‘logica utens’ [10], play
an important role also in the present work. As due to lack of space we can-
not expand on these models, we will assume some familiarity with their basic
concepts.
In this paper we argue that ‘naive’ mathematics emerges from the logica
utens due to the brain’s mathematical faculty. As mathematical concepts are
signs we may talk about the ‘real’ world of mathematics. We hold that akin
to the signs of other knowledge domains also mathematical signs arise via sign
interactions, reinforcing our conjecture that all human semiosis could be based
on a single type of process.
1 inspired by Gary Richmond (pers.comm., 2003)
The model of mathematical signs introduced in this paper heavily relies on
the representation of memory signs. The properties of such signs can be reca-
pitulated as follows [3]. We assume that the state and effect qualities of earlier
observations are organized by the memory in collections and chains of neurons,
respectively. The memory response triggered by the actual input state and effect
is represented, respectively, by an average value (of a collection), and a dense
domain (of a chain) of stored qualities. By denseness we mean that after suffi-
ciently many observations of a type of effect, the brain is capable of representing
any measure of that effect by a relative value of its domain. For example, after
various perceptions of different weights like 1kg, 2kg, etc., the observation of
1.5kg is represented by a sign pointing in the domain of weight-effects, between
the values denoting 1kg and 2kg. If the chain representation of a domain does
not contain a neuron corresponding to the input effect interpreted as a measure,
then the chain is adjusted by including a yet unused new neuron (and quality),
thereby keeping the domain dense.
2 The ontology of cardinality as a sign
In this section we introduce a model for the recognition of cardinality as a sign. In
the first part we discuss the physiological grounds for counting, in the second we
show how such abilities may contribute to the abstract conception of numbers.
2.1 Counting abilities
Recently, Nieder at al. [7] reported the discovery of number-encoding neurons
in the brain. Such neurons fire maximally in response to a specific preferred
number, correctly signifying a wide variety of displays in which the cues are not
confounded. For instance, one such neuron might respond maximally to displays
of four items, somewhat less to displays of three or five items, and none at all to
displays of one or two items. The number-encoding neurons are able to recognize
the number of similar items2 from 1 up to 5, but the representation of number
gets increasingly fuzzy for larger and larger numbers. Many neurons fire selec-
tively a constant 120ms after display onset, whatever the number on the screen
indicating that the neurons ‘count’ without counting (i.e. without enumerating
the items serially). The evolution of number-encoding neurons may entail supe-
riority of a species, as knowledge about the number of preys, or predators could
be crucial. An exotic example for a potential evidence of a dual evolution are
the stripes of the zebra. The intertwining stripes of a group of zebras can make
the observation of their number troublesome.
The sign of the number-encoding neurons is iconic whereas the mathematical
conception of cardinality is symbolic. The intermediate indexical concept, linking
the iconic and symbolic representations, is the concept of ordering. In this paper
we hold that the three types of number signs can be uniformly modeled.
2 An item is a collection of qualities. Similarity holds trivially for a singleton.
The results of [7] indicate that the brain has a counting faculty, and precisely
where. But the signal of the number-encoding neurons is vague already for low
numbers contradicting the common experience that the brain is able to accu-
rately stipulate cardinality (up to a limit) without symbolic counting. Therefore,
in this paper we assume that number-encoding neurons function analogously to
the receptors of the senses, for example, the color receptors of the eye. The
perception of a color is independent from the number of the receptors simulta-
neously discharged. Their signal will signify the same color, but possibly dimmer,
or brighter. We hold that the perception of cardinality follows the same principle.
Each of the similar items of the input possesses a cardinality quality enabling
the recognition of the collection of those items, via categorical perception [5], as
a number.
As cardinality arises in the brain and not in the senses, the perception of
such quality requires a higher level process interpreting the input as a number-
phenomenon and recognizing its cardinality as a number. Notice here the am-
biguous use of ‘cardinality’ as a quality arising for each similar item of the input,
and as a (cardinal) number characterizing the input as a whole.
In our model we assume that the brain by virtue of its counting ability is
able to distinguish the physical input in three types. The observed state can be
either:
• one
something whole; the number-encoding neurons are not active; cardinality
does not arise
• not one
a small multitude; some of the number-encoding neurons are active; cardi-
nality does arise, and can be recognized as a number
• many
a large multitude; the number-encoding neurons are all active; although car-
dinality does arise, it cannot be recognized as a number.
The boundary between one, and not one is typically 1 or 2 (‘chunking’ is not
considered in this paper). A linguistic evidence for the latter is the distinction
between singular, two, and plural, for example: one, both, but all three, all four
etc. Here, singular and two refer to a small multitude which is minimal. The
boundary between not one and many could be between 5 and 9, conform the size
of the working memory [6]. In what follows, we will first analyze the important
case of not one. We will return to many in sect. 3.2.
2.2 The case of not one
As cardinality as a quality arises in the brain, it can be represented as a memory
sign. Because it signifies similarity, a property which is independent from, hence
not part of the input effect, it can be modeled by an a’ memory sign; and because
it does not refer to the primary (i.e. observed) meaning of the input, it must be
complementary.
We argue that input phenomena are always recognized, first, with respect
to their primary meaning. But if the final proposition sign of the observation
is found unsatisfactory, for any reason, then the brain may seek via abduction
another interpretation, and try to recognize the input as a number-phenomenon,
for example.
Following [10] abduction can be modeled by interpreting the difference be-
tween a and a’ as an effect conceptually changing a into a’ . Such interpretation
can be said to involve a ‘shift’ of focus from a to its relative difference with a’ :
we take a different look at the observed phenomenon. The difference between
a and a’ can be computed analogously to the generation of the input qualities
as signs: those a and a’ qualities which are related to each other in the sense of
agreement define a new a:=a’o ∗ao=a’∗a; and those in the sense of possibility a
new b:=a’c \ao+a’o \ac+a’c \ac=a’\a (a subscripted o and c denotes an observed
and a complementary quality, respectively; “\” stands for relative difference).
The above process is completed by merging the input and abducted qualities
together, type-wise.
Abduction can be modeled by a feedback of a and a’ , to the unit generating
the input signs from the physical stimulus via comparison. Notice that a sim-
ilar feedback of b and b’ may not be effective, as b’ being a dense domain, a
meaningful difference cannot be defined. The revised model of perception (first
introduced in [2]) is depicted in fig. 3. In this diagram, the contents of the cur-
rent percept is written into the previous percept after some delay following input
sampling. The control signal (ctrl) is used to selectively inhibit either the feed-
back, or the physical input qualities, respectively, in ‘normal’ and ‘abduction’
operation mode. The latter can be activated if ‘normal’ recognition of the input
fails.
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Fig. 3. The revised model of perception
2.3 Recognition of number-phenomena
We introduce a model for the recognition of number-phenomena on the basis of
the iconic conception of cardinality. Our working example will be the observa-
tion of a multitude of similar cubic bodies. The perceived input and the memory
response qualities are defined as follows (observed and complementary qualities
are merged): a= “cube”; a’ = “memory sign of cube”, “memory sign of cardinal-
ity”; b= “cubic form”, “size”; b’ = “memory sign of cubic form”, “memory sign
of size”. The signs representing the relation between the input and memory are:
A= a∗a’ = cube; ¬A= a+a’ = cardinality; B= b∗b’ = form; ¬B= b+b’ = size.
We assume that the proposition sign characterizing this input, e.g. ‘some
cubes are there’, is found unsatisfactory and that via feedback new input qualities
are abducted. Such new a is a subset of the perceived state qualities, as the
meaning of a is contained in the average meaning of the (observed) a’ qualities,
by definition. Such new b, however, is an effect transforming the perception of
a cube as some ‘thing’ to its perception as a cardinality property. The abducted
new input qualities generate a memory response, but this is omitted in the paper.
The signs representing the relation between the input and the memory, fol-
lowing abduction, amount to the qualisigns of the observation as a number-
phenomenon: A= cube (a cubic body), ¬A= unit value (for counting cubic bod-
ies); B= cardinality (as an appearing new property), ¬B= growth (cardinality
increment corresponding to the unit value, as a property). The recognition of
the input as a cardinality proceeds as follows (below we will directly refer to the
signs recognized, by means of their Peircean types).
The icon (A+B) signifies the input qualities as constituents (similar items).
The sinsign (A∗B) represents the co-occurrence of those qualities as an event.
Because cardinality may arise for any countable input, the sinsign can be said
to characterize the input as a number-event, independent from the type of similar
objects signified.
The rheme (A∗¬B, ¬A∗B) synonymously denotes the general meaning of cu-
bic ‘things’ and the abstract concept of cardinality referring to any such ‘thing’
(number base). The legisign (A∗¬B+¬A∗B) refers to the rule-like relation be-
tween those general concepts, telling how the number of such cubic ‘things’ can
be determined in general by means of their cardinality meaning, for example, by
conceptually accumulating the cardinality qualities in a set representing a mea-
sure (rule of counting). Such procedure needs a unit of counting, synonymously
denoting an increment value, and incrementation (by such a value) as a property.
For example, small cubes can be counted 1/10 each, meaning that ten of such
cubes make up a large one. Such value and property define a type (incr), repre-
senting complementary information, or the context, of a number-phenomenon as
an index sign (¬A+¬B, ¬A∗¬B).
The complementation of the abstract meaning of the rheme, by the indexical
meaning of the context, yields the recognition of the input as an actual multitude
(A+¬B) and cardinality (¬A+B), synonymously referring to the subject of the
observation. Analogous complementation of the legisign obtains the predicate of
the observation (A∗B+¬A∗¬B) denoting an algorithm for the computation of
B number of A entities, using type information due to ¬A and ¬B. Finally, the
interaction between the actual multitude and counting algorithm is interpreted
by counting (in the iconic sense) the similar items signified by the subject. This
is represented by a proposition sign characterizing the input as a number. The
types of number signs are displayed in fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. The types of number signs
2.4 Inclusion ordering
We argue that the indexical conception of cardinality enables the brain to order
different multitudes without symbolic counting. Such ability has been shown to
be present in children already at the age of two [1].
A sample ordering phenomenon is the following. Assume there are two collec-
tions of cubes, on the left- and right-hand side of a separating line, and that the
task is the recognition of the relation between their cardinalities. Additionally we
assume that both collections have been recognized already as a cardinality, and
that now we are concerned with the interpretation of the number of the cubes
on the right-hand side in the context of the number of the cubes on left-hand
side. Ordering as a sign may arise as follows.
The proposition sign of the left-hand side collection (propl) is stored in the
memory. The subsequently recognized proposition sign of the right-hand side
collection (propr) is represented degenerately as a value (nr): ao:=nr; a’o :=nr.
Then, propl is fetched from the memory and represented analogously (nl): ac:=nl;
a’c :=nl. Via feedback, the previous and current percepts are replaced, respec-
tively, by ao, ac, and a’o , a’c . New qualities are generated: new a:=a’∗a=a’o ∗ao=nr;
new b:=a’\a=a’c \ao+a’o \ac+a’c \ac=nl\nr+nr\nl. From the mathematical point
of view, the relative difference, nr\nl, amounts to subtraction, which can be in-
terpreted as an ordering sign, more specifically, as ‘<’, only if nl<nr (remember
that by comparing the previous and current percepts, in the sense of relative
difference, those qualities can be represented which were not there, but are there
now). Similarly, nl\nr can be interpreted as ‘>’, only if nl>nr. If both signs
arise, then nl and nr must be equal (‘=’). The recognition of the new qualisigns
eventually yields the inclusion relation of the right-hand side collection with re-
spect to the left-hand side one (which is either one of less, equal, or greater), as
a proposition sign.
2.5 Symbolic number signs
What makes the indexical concept of cardinality important is that it under-
lies the symbolic one. This can be illustrated by the indexical level rheme sign
which by separately representing the input as a general state (A∗¬B), and an
abstract cardinality effect (¬A∗B), creates the ground for the symbolic concept
of counting any ‘thing’. The primary symbolic numbers arise via learning, from
cardinalities that can be precisely recognized (cf. cardinal numbers).
Let us extend our example above, by the task of rearranging the cubes such
that, in the end, there are equally many cubes on both sides of the separating
line. Children not possessing the symbolic concept of numbers tend to solve such
a task by first collecting all cubes on one side of the line, and then, by moving the
cubes one-by-one, estimating their number on both sides and determining their
equality. Those familiar with symbolic numbers attain the same goal simply
by counting. If rearranging is supervised, and the action of moving a cube is
repeatedly followed by the articulation of “one cube”, the ordering operation and
the referencing to the cubes may become rule-like associated with the numeral
“one”. By executing the operations for many cubes and also for other objects,
the meaning of “one” can be abstracted, prototypically denoting some general
‘thing’ (or state), which is ‘counted’. In general, a finite number of such numerals
can be memorized analogously.
The prototypical meaning of symbolic numbers arises by memorizing (in dif-
ferent observations) the state qualities which are found similar. By computing an
average value for such qualities we may get prototypical concepts like the “mem-
ory sign of (a) cube” introduced in our earlier example, in sect. 2.3. Averaging,
like domain formation, is a generalization process underlying the prototypical
meanings of the memory.
Complex multitudes can be recognized sequentially, via nested observations,
by focusing on contiguous parts of the input which can be individually recog-
nized as number-phenomena. Clearly, such multitudes can be more conveniently
counted by using symbolic numbers. The rules of symbolic counting are subject
to learning akin to language. As such rules are also similar to those of language,
a model for the semiosis of symbolic numbers can be defined easily, for example,
on the basis of the language model introduced in [8].
3 The ‘real’ world of mathematics
We hold that the mathematical ‘universe’ consists of phenomena, which like ‘real’
world phenomena arise via interaction between a state and effect, generating a
next state. What makes cardinality effects specific is their potential for inter-
acting with any state. Whereas all ‘real’ world phenomena can be characterized
(in the philosophical sense) as an ‘existence’, those of the mathematical universe
as a ‘cardinality’ event. In the mathematical world, all state(a) is inherently re-
lated to a cardinality effect(b), hence via interaction the concept of ‘a-number’
can arise. Such number signs as states can be found similar, therefore countable,
in a subsequent number-phenomenon, and can be re-presented as a state, recur-
sively. Consequently, in the mathematical ‘world’, also effect qualities can have
the meaning of a state, although degenerately only.
An illustrating example is the function sin( ), which is an effect, but which
is represented as a state in the symbol phenomenon sin2(x). Such flexible use of
signs is not characteristic for language, which introduces different representations
for the state and the effect meanings of a denotation. For example, the verb run
which is an effect, can be interpreted as a state, but only after ‘converting’ it to a
noun, thereby removing its verbal relational needs. Mathematical signification is
free of such rigidity of re-presentation. The effect meaning of sin( ) is preserved
in sin2(x) such that it still can map its parameter, which is a state (x), to its
image, which is another state (sin(x)). We argue that the rigidity of language
could be a consequence of the automatism characterizing the use of language
rules, for example, in syntactic signification.
Inasmuch in the mathematical world any state and cardinality effect can
interact, the generation of interpreting (new) states is unconstrained. But math-
ematical signs are a ‘projection’ of the holistic meaning of signs (mathematical
signs are signs from the mathematical point of view). Therefore the mathemat-
ical world must be part of the ‘real’ one, in which interactions are constrained,
meaning that not every quality can interact with another. Accordingly, in math-
ematics, in order to avoid the danger of a chaos, the correctness of interactions
has to be verified, for example, by demanding ‘well-formedness’ of the state and
effect qualities. To this end, mathematics introduces the meaning of types. In
the next section we argue that the mathematical concept of a type arises via
refinement, from the indexical level concept of the increment (incr).
3.1 Mathematical types
The correctness of a mathematical operation can be determined by means of
contextual information about the type of the input state and effect qualities.
From the semiotic point of view the operation is well-formed if the index sign
of the input exists, in which case, ¬A+¬B signifies the compatible types of the
input state and effect, and ¬A∗¬B the type of the yield of the operation. The
dicent and symbol sign of a mathematical phenomenon, which arise, respectively,
from the recognized rheme and legisign, via complementation by the index sign,
contain all information necessary for accomplishing the mathematical operation.
Because ¬A and ¬B signify the relation between the input and memory, in
the sense of possibility, also mathematical index signs represent the observed
phenomenon only in a general sense, conform their meaning as a type.
It must be clear from this analysis that the index signs are the key to math-
ematical sign recognition. That, in the mathematical world, effects can have the
meaning of a state, in particular, in the case of nested phenomena, brings about
the need for a specific interpretation of the relation between states and effects.
For example, a function can have any number of parameters that too are func-
tions. As such nested functions do preserve their effect meaning, we have to find
out the type of a nested sign interaction. Such types are the meaning of math-
ematical index signs: if the index sign of an input phenomenon exists, then the
observed mathematical operation can be meaningful.
The basic type of cardinality, ‘natural’ number, follows from the default
meaning of incr, which is enumeration. Other types are due to their specific
number generation rules. For example, the symbolic number-phenomenon “1,5”
can denote, context dependently, a pair of natural numbers, or a single rational.
In sum, the meaning of a type of number is collectively defined by a number pro-
totype (cf. general state) and a number generation rule (cf. prototypical effect).
We hold that also the formal mathematical types of number like natural (N ),
rational (Q) and real (R), arise from the ‘naive’ mathematical concept of a type,
via the iconic, indexical and symbolic re-presentation of the ‘natural’ meaning
of incr, respectively, by a constant, a quotient, and a process.
3.2 The conceptualization of infinite
One of the most contradictory concepts of mathematics is the one of infinite.
In this paper we hold that memory signs are ‘natural’ representations of such
multitudes. Indeed, a’ memory signs denote an averaged value potentially re-
ferring to all qualities related to the input state(a); b’ memory signs refer to
a domain possessing all measures possibly signified by the input effect(b). For
example, a’ =chair denotes the prototypical meaning of any seat that can be func-
tionally sat on like an armchair or a footstool; b’ =run prototypically refers to
any locomotion by foot be it slow or fast.
This potential for representation by the memory allows a twofold interpreta-
tion of the relation between the input and memory qualities. According to the
first, A=a∗a’ is the meaning of a completed by a’ ; B=b∗b’ is the meaning of b
interpreted as a measure of b’ . In both cases, a reference is made to an individual
quality, which is a value. Following the second, A=a∗a’ denotes a collection of
qualities selected by a, which is averaged; and B=b∗b’ a sub-domain of b’ indi-
cated by b, which is a collection of qualities organized in a chain. Now, in both
cases, a reference is made to a collection containing all qualities related, but
this reference does not provide access to those qualities as individual elements.
In this interpretation, A and B can be said to include the ‘naive’ meaning of
infinite.
How does infinite emerge as a sign? Earlier we mentioned that the brain,
due to its number-encoding faculty, is capable of distinguishing the input state
in three types: one, not one, and many. In the last case, the input multitude
possesses a cardinality quality, but no increment. We hold that such multitudes
can be represented as a number, by using the ‘infinite’ interpretation of memory
signs. Indeed, as the individual elements of the collection of qualities referred to
by an average value and a domain cannot be accessed, then clearly there will be
no increment (incr), implying that the multitude in question is not countable. In
our model, the cardinality of such a multitude is denoted by the number sign
‘infinite’.
The above relation between the concept of infinite and the ambiguous mean-
ing of memory signs is also supported by linguistic evidence. For example, in
the utterance ‘the police are going to lunch’, the subject is ambiguously interpreted
as something whole, and as a set of individual persons. This analysis underpins
our conclusion that the concept of infinite, and the prototypical notions of the
memory like house, dog etc. could be related, implicating that memory signs, in
general, may include the meaning of a ‘kind of’ infinite, potentially.
Returning to the mathematical signs, let us finally mention that also the
notion of a formal variable could be explained on the basis of our concept of a
general state. Via abstraction, a prototypical state meaning can be recognized,
denoting a collection having no reference to the contained memory qualities.
Such a sign can be called a ‘formal’ sign: a sign, which is about the form.
3.3 The conceptualization of naught
Cardinality as a quality arises if there are similar items in the input. From this
it follows that we cannot perceive naught as a quality, except via inferencing.
Let us explain this by an example.
Assume the observation of a sample phenomenon having no cardinality mean-
ing, but which we nevertheless try to recognize as a number-phenomenon. As
now the observation is not due to a cardinality effect, we may abductively infer
that there must have been ‘something’ but which has disappeared. If that ‘some-
thing’ may refer to a countable state, its cardinality can be denoted in the actual
observation by naught or zero. In sum, zero is a hypothetical number sign, not
having the meaning of cardinality as a quality, nor the meaning of an increment.
We argue that zero and infinite are dual concepts. The concept of infinite
includes the meaning of a cardinality, but no increment, hence the notion of
infinite is synonymous to the meaning of a multitude classified as one. But as
symbolic numbers, zero(0) and one(1) are, respectively, the unit elements of “+”
and “∗” which in turn are dual representations, in the mathematical sense, of
the sign interaction sorting, justifying our claim.
4 The secondness of mathematics
We maintain that, if logic is a first, then mathematics a second, and language a
third. Notice that by logic we mean innate logic, by mathematics the ‘naive’ con-
cepts of cardinality, and by language the morphological, syntactic and semantic
symbols of natural language.
Logic, from the semiotic point of view, is concerned with the types of relations
that can arise between the dual qualities of a ‘real’ world phenomenon. A logical
relation as a sign is related to the category of: 1stness, if it signifies all qualities,
state and effect, observed and complementary, as independent entities (cf. a, a’ ,
b, b’ ); 2ndness, if it considers the state and effect collections to be independent,
but their observed and complementary subsets to be interrelated (cf. A, ¬A, B,
¬B); 3rdness, if it represents also the state and effect collections as interrelated
entities (cf. A+B, A∗B, . . ., A is B).
Mathematics re-presents the relations found by the logical interpretation of
a phenomenon, and introduces common types for the incomparable dual con-
stituents of an interaction. By defining such types, mathematics lays the foun-
dation for the primary concept of language: the relational need [8] (remember
that the relational need of a symbol specifies its combinatory potential in a
symbol interaction). The mathematical concept of a type defines an induced
ordering of (consecutive) numbers. The cognition of such ordering is supported
by the brain’s potential for separating from each other the similar items of the
input, and thereby introducing a ‘boundary’ between such objects (notice that
separation is less meaningful than identification which also contains the meaning
of differentiation). The existence of such boundaries is crucial for language, as
information about the different items of the input is necessary for determining
the reference of a language symbol, for example, a modifier.
Language ‘lifts’ the three categorical types of logical relations (via the me-
diation of ‘naive’ mathematics), respectively, to the concept of a potentially ex-
isting, a lexically defined possible, and an actual relational need, characterizing
the various types of symbols of natural language.
4.1 Mathematical sign recognition revisited
Finally, let us analyze the representational aspects of mathematical sign recog-
nition, and discuss the relation between mathematical and language signs.
The first ‘level’ of the recognition of a number-phenomenon consists in the
generation of an icon and sinsign representing the observation as some ‘thing’
and ‘event’, respectively. As such an icon and sinsign do not include the meaning
of the input as a number, this level can be said to be purely logical. In language,
analogous meanings can arise due to a morphological root (which can be subject
to affixation) and an affix (requiring a root), for example.
The second ‘level’ contains the recognition of the input as an abstract type
of number. Such a rheme sign denotes the concept of a general number base
(for it does not matter whether houses or dogs are counted), such a legisign a
general rule of counting, and such an index sign an increment (type), which is
a ‘modifier’ in virtue of its potential for making the denotation of the number
base and the rule of counting more specific, but without changing their primary
meaning. This level can be said to be purely mathematical, inasmuch its signs
signify the observed event only as a mathematical operation, that is, from the
structural point of view. Language analogues of the two types of index signs are,
for example, the adjective and adverb symbols; and, respectively, of the rheme
and legisign, are the noun and verb phrases.
The third ‘level’ includes the recognition of the input as a countable multi-
tude (subject) and a counting algorithm (predicate). This level can be said to
be purely language related, as the interaction of such subject and predicate may
propositionally characterize the meaning of the input as a number-phenomenon.
Analogous concepts of natural language are, for example, the syntactic subject
and predicate symbols. Let us remember that mathematical subject and predi-
cate signs can only arise if a suitable context (cf. index sign) exists; otherwise,
the input is considered to be not well-formed. An example for such a (symbolic)
number-phenomenon is “2/1.5” (assuming “/” stands for integer division). The
hierarchy of language signs mentioned in this section is displayed in fig. 5.
Summary
In this paper we assume that knowledge arises from the observation of ‘real’
world phenomena, which are interactions between dual qualities. This duality is
sentence
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Fig. 5. The hierarchy of language concepts
captured by logic, which represents it only as a relation, or a fact. The general-
ization of the independent qualities of the logical relations as types is the main
contribution of (naive) mathematics. Language abstracts the mathematical con-
cept of a type, by lifting it to the meaning of a relational need.
We argue that logic, mathematics, and language, are increasingly more mean-
ingful levels of our representational faculty. Mathematical sign recognition in-
cludes, in some sense, the whole of this innate ability of the brain. Although it is
about mathematical signs only, it shows strong affinity with logical and linguistic
signification as well.
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